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ABSTRACT
In  recent  decades  Europe’s  political  landscape  has  been marked  by  a 
notable rise in the use of mechanisms of direct democracy such as the 
referendum and the citizens’ initiative. Our focus in this article is on the 
national referendums that are directly connected to the European Union 
(EU)  integration  process.  These  types  of  referendums  are  increasingly 
recognised  by  the  scholarly  community  as  the  source  of  institutional 
instability  across  the  wider  EU  polity.  To  explain  the  nature  of  this 
empirical  puzzle  is  this  article’s  main  objective.  However,  instead  of 
pursuing intra-EU comparisons, as does much of the literature, we adopt a 
comparative perspective on the EU that involves the explicit comparison 
with  other  polities.  In  doing  so,  we  bring  to  the  fore  a  neglected 
dimension in the study of EU referendum politics: the operation of federal 
political institutions. We contend that cross-polity comparison of EU forms 
of  direct  democracy  with  other  polities  reveal  insights  that  suggest  a 
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1. Introduction
The politics  surrounding European Union (EU) related referendums has 
received a great deal of scholarly attention recently. This is due to the fact 
that referendums on EU integration can, and do, produce extra-territorial 
effects beyond the particular member state holding the referendum. It is 
in this sense that these types of EU-related referendums are generating a 
sort of structure induced disequilibria1 –in other words these referendums 
are at the source of increasing institutional instability in the EU. The main 
focus of this article is to try to explain the nature of this empirical puzzle. 
We  argue  that  to  identify  the  sources  of  such  institutional  instability 
requires us to look beyond the confines of the EU. In short, it requires a 
cross-polity  comparison.  This  approach  is  rarely  undertaken  in  the 
literature however. Although many analyses are comparative, they usually 
take the form of an intra-EU comparison (e.g. comparing voter or elite 
behaviour  across  member  states  of  the  EU).  The  comparative  politics 
approach we adopt is predicated on the explicit structured and focused 
comparison  of  the  EU  with  other  polities.  In  particular,  we  adopt  a 
comparative federalism lens to understand the interplay of federalism and 
direct democracy in the European integration process. In approaching the 
subject matter in this fashion, we are putting at the core of the analysis a 
neglected dimension to the study of EU-related direct democracy, the role 
of federal political institutions. Bizarrely, given the amount of scholarship 
on this topic, this has not yet been done explicitly.
The referendum politics of the EU can be approached from a number of 
disciplinary angles. We shall concentrate primarily on the political science 
literature, although we should acknowledge the important contributions 
from  the  field  of  law,  and  especially  from  constitutional  lawyers.  For 
heuristic  purposes,  we  can  classify  the  literature  into  four  broad 
categories, though, as with most efforts of this nature, the distinctions 
between categories are often blurred. In fact, the best scholarship tends 
to span most of the categories suggesting that it is more a question of the 
degree to which author(s) privilege a particular dimension. 
1) Normative: This type of approach is dominated by the contributions of 
legal scholars. Not surprisingly, the focus is on the legal and constitutional 
provisions to hold a referendum either in a single member state or, from a 
more comparative perspective,  across  EU member states.  Much of  the 
focus  turns  on  the  constitutional  implications  of  member  state 
referendums on EU integration and its impact on the EU polity as a whole 
(see e.g. the various contributions in Albi & Ziller 2007; Pernice 2006; 
Auer 2005; Auer & Flauss 1997). Issues of accountability and legitimacy 
1 This inverses Shepsle’s (1979) use of the term ‘structure induced equilibria’.
1
C2D Working Paper Series 30/2008
are  usually  at  the  core  of  these  studies  as  is  the  interplay  of 
constitutionalism and mechanisms of direct democracy. 
2)  Institutionalist:  Operating  at  the  macro-level,  recent  institutionalist 
approaches  have  focused  on  trying  to  explain  the  occurrence  of 
referendums  and  the  reasons  why  governments’  decide  to  hold 
referendums by cognitive factors and norms. These studies are descriptive 
in their majority (Qvortrup 2002, 2006; Setälä 1999; Bogdanor 1994) and 
tend to rely on qualitative methodologies. Sometimes the analysis takes 
the form of assessing the relative merits of rationalist versus ideational 
approaches in  explaining EU referendum domino effects  such as  those 
around the European Constitution (Closa 2007). 
3) Behaviourist: Although most of these studies are ‘institutionalist’, they 
can  be  differentiated  from  category  2  in  terms  of  their  reliance  on 
quantitative  methodologies  and/or  spatial  modelling.  This  could  be 
considered  as  the  dominant  approach  and  it  draws  heavily  from  the 
literature on political behaviour. One set of explanations attributes voting 
behaviour in EU referendums to individuals’ values, beliefs or underlying 
attitudes  towards  European  integration  (Svensson  1994,  2002,  2007; 
Franklin et al. 1994; Siune et al. 1994); others focus on the evaluation of 
symbolic  political  considerations,  (i.e.  feelings  of  national  identity)  in 
relation to preferences on EU integration and their effects on voting in EU 
referendums  (Hooghe  &  Marks  2005;  Carey  2002;  McLaren  2002). 
Another  set of studies have examined how the  salience  of the issue of 
European integration affects the ability of voters to make competent and 
reasoned  decisions  in  a  European  context  (see  Christin  et  al.  2002; 
Franklin  2002).  There  are  also  an  increasing  number  of  behaviourist 
studies that analyse the effects of political parties on holding referendums 
(Hooghe  et  al.  2002;  Marks  et  al.  2002;  Hix  1999).  Indeed,  this  has 
generated a lively debate on whether party positioning is top-down (from 
elites to masses) or bottom-up (from constituents to party elites) (Ray 
2003) or a combination of the two processes (Steenbergen et al. 2007). 
Finally, we should mention the influential work of  Hug (2002) due to its 
systematic  theoretical,  empirical  and  comparative  framework.  Hug 
employs formal modelling to test the impact of legal-constitutional factors 
on patterns of voting behaviour (see also Hug & Sciarini 2000; Schneider 
& Weitsman 1996). 
4) Comparative: Explicitly  comparative approaches,  by which we mean 
comparing the EU-related referendum experience with  other polities, are 
characterised by their conspicuous absence. Trechsel’s (2005) structured 
comparison of the unanimity constraint in Switzerland, the US and the EU, 
and how in the latter case it has not been overcome, is a rare exception. 
The absence of explicit comparison is a peculiar lacuna in the field since 
comparison  could,  conceivably,  take  a  variety  of  forms.  The  origins, 
operation,  and  sustainability  of  EU-related  mechanisms  of  direct 
democracy are topics which, we argue, invite comparison.  Each of these 
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dimensions, in theory, could be compared to experiences in other polities 
thereby shedding comparative insights on the EU. No doubt because we 
are intervening in a process that is in its infancy, this is rarely done. In 
this article we shall pursue this specific comparative route.  
This rest of this article is structured according to the following lines. First, 
it  sets  out  a  comparative  federalism  framework  as  a  tool  for  case 
selection.  It  suggests  areas  where  the  interplay  of  federal  and  direct 
democratic political institutions could be investigated. In section 3, this 
heuristic is applied to the case of the EU to reveal a number of models. 
We  then  examine  the  models  against  the  EU-related  referendum 
experience. The analysis  takes two forms: the first  stage presents the 
evidence  on  EU-related  referendums,  the  second,  more  qualitatively 
oriented,  offers  an  analytical  narrative  on  the  recent  and  ill-fated 
European Constitution. Based on the preceding analysis, the concluding 
section  examines  the  implications  of  each  model  as  a  means  for 
overcoming the EU’s present structure induced disequilibria. 
2. Comparative federalism as a tool for case selection 
Federalism was famously described by one of its most prominent scholars, 
William Riker, as a theory of government that uses a system of checks 
and balances to curb power and offers an alternative to empire (Riker 
1964).  This being so, it is surprising how the federalism variable has been 
conspicuously  absent  from  analyses  of  the  EU’s  experience  with 
referendums. If  anything, the EU’s most recent referendum experience 
has  demonstrated  the  ‘check’  function  of  national  referendums on  the 
perceived imperial ambitions of EU elites –at least from the perspective of 
‘no’ voters. In order to investigate the interplay of federalism and direct 
democracy in the European integration process, let us start with some 
definitions. According to Føllesdal (2003), a federal arrangement refers to 
a political order where ‘final authority is divided between sub-units and a 
center’ and in which ‘sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least 
two territorial levels so that units at each level have final authority and 
can  act  independently  of  the  others  in  some  area.’  This  suggests  a 
promising  avenue  for  comparative  research  on  the  EU  but  raises  one 
potential point of controversy: federalism and statehood. The EU is clearly 
not  a  state,  but,  as  one  eminent  scholar  of  federalism has argued,  a 
federal  arrangement  need  not  be  coupled  with  notions  of  statehood 
(Elazar  1987).  Much  of  the  literature  on  European  integration  follows 
some rather different premises however. Put simply, many students of EU 
politics part from what in the jargon is known as the n = 1 problem, the 
notion that the EU is a unique case,  sui generis  (Hix 1998). But, so too 
are continent-sized polities like the US and Brazil, or smaller ones such as 
Switzerland and Belgium. Does this mean we should not compare these 
polities? Clearly not. A consequence of the EU  sui generis model is that 
comparison is avoided in favour of solipsistic theorisations about unique 
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integration  mechanisms  or  novel  forms  of  governance  that  are  not 
necessarily rooted in the broader political science discipline. To the extent 
that the EU has features comparable to more mature political systems, we 
should explore the explanatory value of the comparative method and this, 
we  argue,  applies  with  equal  force  to  the  study  of  EU-related  direct 
democracy. With this broad disclaimer in place we can now proceed and 
set out a comparative federalism framework for investigating the EU.
The  literature  on  federalism  tends  to  identify  a  special  category  of 
federations among the so-called advanced democracies.  The ‘five usual 
federal suspects’ n = 5, are Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and 
the US. The five usual federal suspects have figured quite prominently in 
policy studies,  although sometimes the federal  n = 6, when Austria  is 
added (e.g.  see Keman 2000; Lijphart  1984).  More problematic  is  the 
inclusion of other quasi-federal suspects such as Belgium, Spain and Italy, 
though these can be referred to as a distinct  category of  ‘regionalised 
systems’ (Braun 2000). For instance, on the basis of a series of empirical 
indicators,  such  as  central  and  sub-unit  revenues  and  expenditures, 
regional  grants  from  central  government,  and  the  strength  of 
bicameralism, Braun (2000) identifies a distinct ‘federal group’ composed 
of the five usual federal suspects. There is thus a reasonable degree of 
consensus  in  the  literature  as  to  this  special  category  of  advanced 
industrial states.  
The argument put forward in this article is that it is possible to narrow this 
federal group further still. This is precisely the logic behind some of the 
latest  comparative  federalism scholarship  on  the  EU  (Menon  &  Schain 
2006). A number of  relevant concepts emerge from the literature that 
essentially refer to the same phenomena: ‘compound polity’, ‘separation 
of powers federal system’, and ‘fragmented power federal systems’. We 
shall employ the less wordy concept of a compound polity.  The term is 
used by Fabbrini (2004) to describe a form of political organisation that is 
characterised  by  a  dual  or  multiple separations  of  powers:  vertically 
between the sub-units and the centre; and horizontally in terms of divided 
institutions.  All  federal  states  have  a  vertical  separation  of  powers 
between territorial units, though, this does not imply they separate power 
across horizontal institutions. According to Fabbrini (2004), apart from the 
US, the only other ‘compound polity’ that exists which is organized around 
a federal distribution of territorial power and a separation of institutions at 
the governmental level is Switzerland. However, he then omits the Swiss 
case to argue that the EU is a compound polity à la US (see also Fabbrini 
&  Sicurelli  2004).  Kelemen’s  work  on  ‘separation  of  powers  federal 
system’ also explicitly incorporates the EU to his research design (2000, 
2004).  Kelemen identifies  two  types  of  federal  polities:  ‘separation  of 
powers federal systems’ and ‘parliamentary federal systems’. He includes 
the US and the EU within the first category, while Australia and Canada 
(Germany could also be added) fall within the second. We can surmise, 
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therefore, that a compound polity is a special class of federal polity that is 
characterised by a fragmented centre and needs to be distinguished from 
classic  parliamentary  federal  systems  (e.g.  Germany,  Australia  and 
Canada).  In  the  latter  case,  the  executive  and  legislature  are  fused 
whereas in a compound polity there is clear separation (Kelemen 2000). 
Therefore,  from  a  comparative  federalism  perspective  the  US, 
Switzerland,  and  the  EU  form  a  very  limited  universe  of  compound 
polities.  Given  that  the  object  of  our  comparative  inquiry  is  to  shed 
comparative light on the EU, we can refer to this as an n = 2 + EU type of 
research design (where the 2 refers to the US and Switzerland). What are 
the  implications  of  this  type  of  institutional  setting  for  investigating 
political  processes,  and  can  any  comparative  insights  be  applied  to 
patterns of EU-related direct democracy? 
We know that the institutional design of a polity has a significant impact 
on a host of political processes, for instance, on the way in which elections 
and parties function or on policy and regulatory styles, to name but a few. 
Indeed, this is the main contribution of what goes by the name of ‘new 
institutionalism’  in  political  science.  Essentially,  the  institutional  setting 
determines  political  opportunity  structures  by  constraining/enabling 
particular courses of action to political agents, thus, producing so-called 
‘structure-induced  equilibria’  (Shepsle  1979;  Riker  1980).  In  short, 
institutions matter and we should be able to detect their effects on, say, 
the policy process or party system. An obvious corollary is that this could 
be the same for the operation of mechanisms of direct democracy in the 
EU. Recent comparative research on the EU has shown that with regard to 
the policy dynamics, compound polities do produce distinctive features in 
a broad range of policy fields including the environment (Kelemen 2000), 
fiscal and monetary policy (McKay 2005), social regulation (Obinger et al. 
2005), and internet policies (Mendez 2005). What about the nature of 
political contestation, the party system or the way in which elections and 
parties  function?  Clearly,  this  is  an area inextricably  connected  to our 
broader  theoretical  and  empirical  ambitions  for  understanding  the  EU-
related referendum experiences.
Over  the  last  two  decades  the  EU  has  become  a  much  more  hotly 
contested  arena  for  political  parties,  interest  groups  and  social 
movements.  The  rise  of  EU-related  referendum  politics  is  clearly  a 
manifestation  of  this  politicisation.  One place  to  start,  therefore,  is  to 
examine the nature of  political  contestation  over European integration. 
Scholarship in this area draws much of its intellectual inspiration from the 
1960s  research  of  Lipset  and  Rokkan  (1967)  on  cleavage  structures. 
Applied to the EU, comparative politics research in this field focuses on the 
contours of the EU political space. Such research is directly relevant to our 
empirical inquiry. One contribution to the field, the Hix and Lord model, 
postulates  two  dimensions  of  contestation  that  shape  the  European 
political space: more versus less European integration on one axis, and 
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Left versus Right ideology on the other axis (Hix 1999; Hix & Lord 1997). 
In  the  language of  Lipset  and Rokkan the first  dimension  is  territorial 
while the second is functional. Hix and Lord’s argument is that these axes 
exist in the EU much in the same way as the territorial and functional 
cleavages persist in compound polities such as the US and Switzerland 
(the same can be said for Belgium and Canada)2. In this connection Riker, 
also writing in the 1960s, drew attention to the party system as the main 
variable intervening between the background social  conditions we have 
just  identified and the sustainability  of  a  federation  (1964).  The more 
decentralised the party system, the more unlikely a centralised federation 
would  develop.  One  implication  that  can  be  drawn  from  this  is  that 
fragmented horizontal institutions in multi-tiered polities tend to have a 
considerable impact on the party system (Hix 1998: 31). Many indices 
have been compiled for comparative research on the EU and federal party 
systems that suggest a broad area of homogeneity (Thorlakson 2005). For 
instance, the party system tends to be decentralised and less cohesive in 
compound polities. All of these factors play a crucial role in structuring the 
European  political  space,  its  party  system  and  the  nature  of  political 
contestation. By extension, it is likely that this will directly impact on EU-
related referendum politics. We shall return to these questions below.
3. Inserting direct democracy into the federal equation
A broad area of homogeneity has been established to narrow our federal 
universes to three cases. Furthermore, it has been argued that the basic 
institutional set up of ‘compound polities’ has important structuring effects 
on within-polity forms of  political  contestation in the European political 
space.  By  extension,  it  can  be  hypothesised  that  this  will  impact 
considerably  on  EU-related  referendum  politics.  Let  us  now  introduce 
mechanisms of direct democracy more explicitly into the federal equation. 
What can we learn? The first thing to note is that mechanisms of direct 
democracy exist in all three polities. At a superficial level, there is some 
degree of similarity among the cases in terms of the use of mechanisms of 
direct democracy at the sub-unit level. There is, of course, a considerable 
degree of variance in the intensity of use and spread at the sub-unit level 
among the three polities. Nevertheless, the mechanisms are present in 
one form or other across the cases. At one extreme, a small number of EU 
member states have a well established tradition of direct democracy (e.g. 
Italy,  Ireland,  Denmark)  and  this  may  be  spreading  to  some  of  the 
recently democratised countries and new member states of Central and 
Eastern Europe (e.g. Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania). At the other end of the 
spectrum,  mechanisms  of  direct  democracy  are  firmly  rooted  in  the 
political culture of Switzerland and are used across all the sub-units, i.e. 
the cantons (Linder 2006).  Somewhere in  the middle  is  the US where 
2 For an extended discussion see Mair 2004 and Hooghe et al. 2002.
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almost half of the states (24 states) have well established mechanisms of 
citizen  initiatives  and  referendums (Bowler  & Donavon  1998;  Butler  & 
Ramney 1994)3. Similar patterns can be found at the sub-sub-unit level in 
the  US  where  many  localities  offer  these  participatory  mechanisms 
(Matsusaka 2003),  and the same is  true for  EU member states.  From 
comparative perspective Switzerland is, again, an outlier in terms of the 
practice of direct democracy at the communal level.
Instruments  of  direct  democracy  can  therefore  be  considered  as  well 
established practices across the three cases although their intensity and 
spread may vary at the sub-unit level (and lower-level units). When our 
attention is turned to the federal-level however, a rather different picture 
crystallises. Here one can clearly distinguish between the US and the EU 
on one side, and Switzerland on the other. There are no mechanisms for 
federal-level referendums in the US or in the EU. In fact, if we extend our 
sample to include the other ‘usual federal suspects’ we find that the same 
is true for Germany where, largely as a result of the negative Weimer 
republic  experience,  referendums  are  banned  at  the  federal  level. 
Australia  and  Canada,  on  the  other  hand,  have  had  federal-level 
referendum experiences  though this  needs to  be qualified.  The federal 
referendum  tool  has  rarely  been  used  in  Canada  (three  times  in  its 
history), whereas in Australia 49 federal referendums have been held thus 
far.4 With 550 referendums since its foundation as a modern federal state 
in 1848, Switzerland is  clearly  an outlier case among federal  states in 
terms of  the intensity  of  its  use  of  federal  referendums5.  By contrast, 
there are no mechanisms for holding federal level referendums in the EU 
or the US. This is despite periodic calls for holding a national referendum 
in the US (a national initiative to be more precise) and similar calls in the 
EU (Magleby 1998 on the US). In fact, there were serious calls during the 
drafting  of  the  European  Constitution  for  an  EU-wide  referendum,  but 
these were eventually shirked by the Presidium that drafted the document 
(de Witte 2005).
Based on the analysis above it appears that the EU is closer to the US 
model. This suggests an important distinction among the three compound 
polities: the presence or not of  federal-level  referendums. However,  to 
leave  the  issue  here  would  be  rather  premature  and  ignore  a  critical 
element. In the US model, the sub-units are prohibited from undertaking 
referendums  on  federal  issues.  In  the  Swiss  model  there  are  various 
constitutional mechanisms, some mandatory others optional, for the sub-
units to act as a veto point through popular votes on federalisation issues. 
In  the  EU  case,  under  special  circumstances,  the  sub-units  can  also 
3 In fact, all US states except for Delaware have a provision for a constitutional referendum for 
amendments to state constitutions (see Magleby 2001)
4 Further  information  on  the  referendums  can  be  obtained  at  the  C2D’s  database: 
http://www.c2d.ch 
5 Data available at the c2d database: http://www.c2d.ch
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perform this veto role suggesting a functional similarity of sorts among 
the  two  compound  polities  –at  least  from  a  bottom-up  sub-unit 
perspective. There is something clearly anomalous here. In line with the 
geometric heuristic of this article, the anomaly can be expressed in the 
following way: The EU is  characterised by the presence of  horizontally 
fragmented referendum mechanisms across the sub-units on federal-level 
issues,  whereas  Switzerland  possess  vertically  integrated  referendum 
mechanisms at the federal level. In other words, some sub units (e.g. 
Ireland,  Denmark or  France) hold  EU-related referendums while  others 
(e.g. Germany and Greece) do not. This is what we refer to as horizontal 
fragmentation.  In  the  Swiss  case,  vertically  integrated  referendum 
mechanisms imply horizontal homogeneity across the sub-units on federal 
level issues since all the sub-units are required to vote (this is what is 
commonly  understood  as  a  federal  referendum).  As  discussed  above, 
horizontal fragmentation in the US and the EU certainly exists across the 
sub-units on sub-unit issues (i.e. referendums on state-level issues in the 
US or member state level issues in the EU). This need not be a source of 
institutional disequilibria so long as the referendums are  not on federal-
level issues. The problem is clearly with regard to federal-level issues. In 
relation to the EU, therefore, the problem is clearly rooted in the presence 
of horizontally fragmented referendum mechanisms across the sub-units 
on  federal-level  issues.  Most  analysts  would  certainly  concur  with  the 
diagnosis –it is not the stuff of rocket science. However, we argue, that in 
formulating the problem in this comparative way we are able to identify a 
number of possible trajectories, or models as we call them. We can now 
explore the features of these EU-related direct democracy models in more 
detail. 
We start with the assumption that the EU faces a problem and that this is 
in  some way  connected  to  its  institutional  design.  This  is  a  relatively 
uncontroversial  statement on which there is a high degree of scholarly 
consensus (Ponzano et al. 2007; Trechsel 2005). Our next claim is that 
the problem is producing certain structure induced disequilibria.  This last 
claim needs some further substantiation, though some progress has been 
made. Using the comparative method –that is by highlighting similarities 
and differences among compound polities- we have identified one possible 
source  of  the  problem  among  compound  polities.  It  seems  that  this 
anomalous feature of the EU is at the core of the empirical puzzle this 
article  addresses.  Can  comparative  federalism  shed  any  further 
explanatory light on this? In order to try to answer this question, let us 
restate the problem in terms of possible models deductively drawn out 
from the analysis thus far. 
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Figure 1. Models of compound polity related direct democracy (DD)
Figure 1 identifies the four possible models drawn out from our analysis. 
The two dimensions represent the vertical and horizontal elements of our 
analysis and graphically depict the anomalous position of the EU. Referred 
to  as  Model  1,  or  the  status  quo,  the  EU  position  in  the  lower  right 
quadrant is the source of institutional disequilibria –at least with regard to 
the  operation  of  EU-related  referendums.  Apart  from  the  present  EU 
model,  there  are  at  least  two  further  models  that  we  can  empirically 
identify from a compound polity perspective. We have sketched out the 
contours of these models in the preceding analysis. To briefly recapitulate, 
Model 2, the US model, does not possess vertically integrated referendum 
mechanisms  at  the  federal  level  (i.e.  no  federal  referendums). 
Furthermore, it is not horizontally fragmented on federal level issues since 
the  sub-units  cannot  undertake  popular  votes  in  this  domain  (i.e.  no 
state-level  referendums  on  federal  issues).  Functionally,  this  is  not 
dissimilar  from  the  German  case.  The  Swiss  variant,  model  3,  has 
vertically  integrated  institutions  of  referendums on federal  issues.  This 
implies  a  horizontal  homogeneity  across  the  subunits  on  federal  level 
issues. Although procedures and intensities may differ, this is functionally 
similar  to Canada and Australia.  The question mark in the upper right 
quadrant suggests a theoretical construct for which there appears to be 
no known empirical case –at least with regard to our federal universe of 
five, or our sample of the three compound polities.
Our  comparative  analysis  has  led  us  to  deductively  identify  these 
distinctive models. If we assume that the EU-related referendum problem 
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is a source of institutional disequilibria that will need to be addressed, as 
we do, then it follows that these are the only models available. To explore 
the relative merits or likelihood of each model, we shall need to take a 
closer look at the data on the EU-related referendum experience. Do these 
data  reveal  any  distinctive  patterns  that  may  favour  one  or  another 
model?
4. Charting the rise of direct democracy in the EU 
A total of 47 EU-related referendums have been held over the last fifty 
years.  Tables  1-3  (see  below)  show  the  frequency  of  votes  and  the 
emerging patterns – essentially  an increase over  the last  two decades 
independently of how we classify the referendums. In many respects, the 
referendums  provide  us  with  a  rather  neat  proxy  for  the  relative 
politicisation of the EU. For more or less the first 30 years of its history 
the EU (the EC as it was then called) was a rather low profile affair mostly 
preoccupied with the technicalities of establishing a customs union and a 
common market. Incidentally,  this is the period where the nation-state 
reached its apogee and Europe was certainly below most citizens’ political 
radar  screen.  The  literature  has  sometimes  referred  to  this  as  the 
‘permissive consensus’, a golden age where citizens appeared to provide 
elites  a  free  reign  on  EU  matters  (Norris  1997).  By  the  mid-1980s 
however, a number of externally induced challenges, such as the twin oil 
shocks, resulted in many member state pursuing divergent response to 
the  economic  fallout  and  this  appeared  to  be  adversely  affecting  the 
European  economy.  Crucially,  it  provided  EU  policy  elites  with  the 
opportunity  and  justification  to  put  forward  a  series  of  federalising 
measures  around  a  constitutional  package  referred  to  as  the  Single 
European Act  (McKay 1999).  The common market  was now effectively 
reinvented as the ‘internal market’ and sold to EU citizens as part of a new 
liberalising programme set against a psychological  deadline, 1992. This 
process, it could be said, reached its climax with the creation of a single 
currency, the euro, and the establishment of the European Central Bank in 
the  late  1990s.  In  this  connection,  France’s  1992  ‘petit  oui’  on  the 
Maastricht Treaty, 51 per cent in favour, and Denmark’s ‘no’6, provided 
some  of  the  first  signs  of  the  awakening  ‘sleeping  giant’  of  political 
contestation on European issues (van der Eijk & Franklin 2004). Indeed, 
as any student of federalism knows, regulating markets can quickly spill-
over into other domains. 
6 A ‘yes’ vote was achieved in 1993, the following year, when the Danes voted for the second 
time. 
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Table  1.  EU-related referendums 1958-2007 (includes non-EU member 
states)
Table 2. EU referendums of the current 27 EU member states 
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Table  3.  EU  polity  referendums  (excludes  non-Member  states  and 
Accession referendums)
And so this has been the case with the EU. By the late  1990s a new 
mobilising agenda centred on establishing an 'area of freedom, security 
and justice' generated a flurry of policy initiatives in a domain that, in 
contrast to technical regulatory questions, now touched upon core areas 
of  statehood.  The  creation  of  a  European  Police  Office,  a  European 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, a Joint Situation Centre for coordinating 
intelligence,  or  a  European  External  Borders  Agency,  are  just  a  few 
examples of the activity in this domain. In a similar vein, the geo-politics 
of the new post-Cold War order propelled EU policy elites to seek, if not a 
common policy, then, at least greater coordination in foreign and defence 
affairs. How else could member states deal with security problems in their 
own backyards such as the fallout from the dissolution of Yugoslavia? One 
does  not  need  to  be  armed  with  the  latest  public  opinion  data  to 
acknowledge that this activity over the last two decades has led to greater 
political contestation around the European issue (Hooghe et al. 2002). It 
is no accident, therefore, that this is neatly dovetailed by the activation of 
increasing EU-related referendum politics as shown in the tables. 
The cursory sketch of EU policymaking patterns over the last fifty years 
reveal  classic  patterns  of  political  authority  transfer  that  are  familiar 
terrain to any student of federalism (Donahue & Pollack 2001). Indeed, 
these  patterns  and  processes  of  federalisation  would  be  immediately 
recognisable, say, to a constitutional lawyer acquainted with the US or 
Swiss  model  of  federalism.  Are  there  any  specific  constitutional  or 
institutional features that can account for the particular sequencing of EU-
related referendums? And, can comparative federalism shed any further 
light on this matter? Perhaps it can. For instance, we know that political 
dynamics in federal polities tend to be characterised by a continuous ebb 
and flow of authority among various levels of public authority and that this 
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can generate high levels of ‘constitutional  politics’  over the appropriate 
vertical allocation of authority (Donahue & Pollack 2001). The point is that 
there are some very important path-dependent reasons for this (Pierson 
2000). Two factors can be especially singled out. First, compound polities, 
such as the US and Switzerland (to which we add the EU), constitute 
examples of what Alfred Stepan classifies as ‘coming together’ types of 
federalism (1999). This type of polity consists  of a coming together of 
previously  distinct  units  to  form a new body politic.  Most  importantly, 
these  polities  tend  to  be  characterised  by  a  fear  of  excessive  central 
government power and posses institutional arrangements that constrain 
the centre from overriding the sub-units (Føllesdal  2003). Second, there 
are constitutionally codified protections to prevent this from happening. 
Thus,  a common feature of  compound polities is  that  one of  the core 
powers delegated to the centre is the regulation of the market. On the 
other hand, another common feature of compound polities is that matters 
related to internal security, for instance, have typically been reserved to 
the sub-units.  None of  the foundational  constitutional  texts  in  the US, 
Switzerland,  or  the  EU  contained  provisions  that  granted  the  centre 
competencies  in  the  field  of  internal  security.  Creeping  centralisation 
evolved over time and as a result of intense policy clashes. 
There is one last element that needs to be added to this argument. It 
reveals a difference among the compound polities that may account for 
the sequencing of EU-related referendums. It amounts to this: whereas 
the US has a very succinct Constitution with remarkably concise coverage 
of  competences,  the  lengthy  constitutional  documents  of  the  EU  and 
Switzerland have much more complex catalogues of competencies.7 This 
suggests another factor at play in explaining the accretion of powers to 
the centre: the role of non-majoritarian institutions. In the US the federal 
legislature has been aided in its federalisation efforts by judicial activism 
on the part of the Supreme Court. These options are simply not available 
in  the EU or  Switzerland.  Instead,  constitutional  amendments  in  areas 
reserved to the sub-units are subject to a popular vote in Switzerland and, 
in the EU, to the periodic and familiar constitutional amendment packages 
referred  to  as  Treaties.  In  short,  while  EU  politics  was  mainly  about 
technical  and  regulatory  matters  concerned  with  the  common market, 
there  was  little  need  for  constitutional  amendments.  The  relevant 
regulatory powers were contained in the foundational constitutional text, 
the 1957 Treaty of  Rome. But,  as soon as the EU desired to address 
adjacent policy areas in response to external and internal challenges, such 
as monetary union, internal security or foreign affairs, then constitutional 
amendments permitting such action would be required. Federal legislation 
could not simply be passed in these new areas of policy concern without 
the  explicit  attribution  of  such  competences.  There  was  no  other 
7 As Pernice (2002) notes the EU has a very detailed, differentiated and complex catalogue of 
competencies. 
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constitutional anchor on which to proceed, nor any scope for the European 
Court of Justice to engage in the kind of judicial activism characteristic of 
the  US  Supreme  Court  in  these  new  policy  areas.  Instead,  the 
constitutional packages that we have come to recognise as the successive 
EU Treaties had to be negotiated. In view of some of the sensitive areas 
that these treaties now touched upon, the incentives were ripe for greater 
politicisation and the activation of EU referendum politics. This accounts 
for  the  patterns  of  EU-related  referendums  in  tables  1-3  above,  and, 
perhaps more importantly, suggests that it will continue to be a feature of 
EU constitutional politics. 
5.  The  fall  of  direct  democracy?  The  EU  Constitution  and  its 
sequel(s)
From a comparative federalism perspective, the patterns and timing of 
EU-related referendums exhibit features that are not surprising. As the 
preceding section has argued, there is nothing especially puzzling about 
their  recent  proliferation.  Still,  we  are  some  way  from  adjudicating 
between the competing models with which we started. A closer look at the 
EU’s experience with the European Constitution and what we refer to as 
its  sequel(s)  may  provide  us  with  some  further  insights.8 Could  the 
European Constitution and its sequel(s) represent a critical juncture for 
EU-related referendum politics? The first thing to note is that for the best 
part of almost a decade, EU leaders and policy elites have been engaged 
in an institutional drama of continent-wide proportions.  Four European 
cities can neatly serve as symbolic markers of the process. Laeken, where 
the initial script was drawn up in 2001, provided the basis for creating a 
constitutional convention presided by the former French President Giscard 
D’Estaing. It led us directly to Rome where the European Constitution was 
ceremoniously signed in 2004. After the French and Dutch rejection the 
following year, a repackaged version of the constitution was signed by EU 
leaders in Lisbon at the end of 2007. In Dublin, six months later, a ‘no’ 
result was announced in June 2008 triggering an immediate political crisis. 
What can we surmise from the institutional saga and can a comparative 
federalism framework shed any light on the process?
Let us start with  Laeken and the resulting constitutional convention. By 
the time EU elites had decided on this course of action it can be said that 
the  ‘sleeping  giant’  of  political  contestation  on  EU  matters  had  been 
awakened. But what was the rationale behind Laeken in the first place? 
There  is  an  abundant  literature  providing  ‘thick’  descriptions  of  the 
intricacies  of  the  constitutional  convention  process  (Deloche-Gaudez 
8 The (s) at the end of the singular ‘sequel’ denotes the fact that at the time of writing we do 
not know whether there will be a single sequel (i.e. a ratified Reform Treaty) or whether a new 
treaty will be drafted. 
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2007; Schönlau 2007). This need not concern us. We have already noted 
that the periodic negotiation of constitutional packages is a staple feature 
of the federalisation process in the EU. The Laeken declaration and the 
constitutional  convention  could  therefore  be  seen  from  this  functional 
perspective. Alternatively, one could privilege ideational mechanisms as 
do many constructivist-inspired explanations. Indeed, the importance of 
ideas and discourses in  this  initially  elite-driven process  should not be 
underestimated. Neither should the novelty and the symbolic significance 
of  the  European  constitutional  convention  as  a  mechanism for  further 
democratisation. Intriguingly, the convention process implicated at least 
three  models  of  democracy:  a  representative model  (through  the 
appointment of national representatives to the Convention); a deliberative 
model (through the discussions and forums that were organised involving 
wider civil society groups); and a  direct democracy model (through the 
referendums that were called for  in more than a third  of  the member 
states).  Clearly,  one  could  draw  parallels  with  similar  constitutional 
conventions processes elsewhere. The most popular default comparison is, 
of  course,  with  the  US  Philadelphia  (Fabbrini  2004;  Deloche-Gaudez 
2003). Less attention has been paid to the Swiss constitutional convention 
of  1847 (Trechsel  2005 is an exception).  Yet,  as we shall  note below, 
though there were important similarities among the three constitutional 
convention experiences, crucial differences remained. 
Our  attention  can  now  be  focused  more  squarely  on  Rome and  the 
subsequent ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty ceremoniously 
signed there in 2004. The crucial point is that the choice of ratification 
mechanisms  was  left  to  the  sub-units  (de  Witte  2005).  This  was  not 
wholly  unprecedented.  For  instance,  the  US  and  Swiss  constitutional 
conventions had done exactly the same. Interestingly, the EU Constitution 
even contained  a  Plan  B  whereby  the  EU’s  highest  political  body,  the 
European Council, would decide on how to proceed if ratification problems 
were  encountered  (Ziller  2007).  If  after  two  years  of  signing  the  EU 
Constitution four-fifths of the Member States had ratified it and one or 
more encounter problems then the European Council  would step in. So 
what went wrong? A historical counterfactual could be offered here as a 
clue. The constitutional convention process in all three cases involved a 
rejection of the Constitution by some of the sub-units. Nine Swiss cantons 
rejected the 1848 constitution as did Rhode Island the US constitution of 
1789. It is not clear that ratification would have proceeded as smoothly as 
it did if Virginia in the US or, say, Zurich in the Swiss case, had said ‘no’ 
as did France in the EU.9 There is no way to prove this or the equally 
speculative hypothesis that even if the UK had said ‘no’ a solution may 
have been found at the European Council level given the high likelihood of 
such a ‘no’. Clearly, it matters politically who says ‘no’. Although legally 
9 In fact, in the case of the US the imperative that Virginia adopt the new Constitution is 
highlighted  by  the  ‘Connecticut  Compromise’  which  specifically  addressed  Virginia's 
outspoken objections.
15
C2D Working Paper Series 30/2008
equivalent, there is a political gulf between a French ‘no’ and an Irish ‘no’, 
as elites in the latter case are repeatedly learning. 
It should be noted that EU related referendum politics were triggered well 
before  the  European  Constitution  had  been  signed.  Indeed,  a  domino 
effect across the member states could be detected. This is not new. For 
instance, when the EU enlarged to incorporate ten new member states in 
2004 a similar referendum domino effect was generated. Between March 
and September 2003 nine of the ten candidate countries put EU accession 
to a popular vote. But these referendums did not impact on the EU-polity 
as such – they were external-polity referendums whereas referendums on 
the  European Constitution  had within-polity  effects.  Clearly,  there  is  a 
difference. Nonetheless, the domino effect is important to note. By the 
time of the first rejection of the European Constitution, the French ‘no’, 
ten member states had announced their plan to hold a popular vote. This 
was certainly not expected. A critical juncture was no doubt the British 
Prime Minister’s unexpected decision to promise a referendum. The French 
President’s  decision  followed days  later.  Both  decisions  were  taken  by 
political leaders under intense pressure within their own parties and from 
opposition parties.  There is  a lively scholarly debate on the ratification 
process  and why some member states  opted for  a popular  vote while 
others chose the parliamentary route. Usually it involves pitting rational 
choice  against  ideational  explanations  (see  Closa  2007  for  a  review). 
Clearly  elements  of  both  the  logic  of  calculation  and  the  logic 
appropriateness were at play here (Hall & Taylor 1996). In some cases, 
the explanation is much more straightforward. Germany, for instance, is 
constitutionally prohibited from holding a referendum though this did not 
prevent  some  political  forces  from  calling  for  one.  The  French  ‘no’, 
followed by the Dutch ‘no’ a few days later, appeared to seal the fate of 
the European Constitution ceremoniously signed in Rome seven months 
earlier.  
But the European Constitution did not go away – too much political capital 
had already been invested. Besides, EU elites believed that without many 
of the institutional changes the EU political machinery would grind to a 
halt.  Thus,  after  allowing citizens  their  say and politely  listening  for  a 
period,  EU  political  elites  retook  the  driving  seat  and  pursued  what 
became  the  Lisbon route.  The  trauma  of  the  French  and  Dutch  ‘no’ 
triggered a number of elite reactions two of which are worth mentioning. 
The first to come, literally days after the two referendum votes, was the 
call  by  European  Council  for  a  ‘period  of  reflection’.  In  parallel,  the 
European Commission launched its Plan D (Democracy, Dialogue, Debate) 
which was supposed to lay the foundations for the profound debate about 
Europe’s future. The period of reflection conveniently lasted until January 
2007 when Germany took charge of the EU presidency. Only a political 
heavyweight  such  as  Germany  under  the  leadership  of  Merkel  could 
resuscitate the European Constitution. Much political wrangling took place 
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as  the  delicate  compromise  signed  in  Rome  began  to  unravel.  The 
negotiations  reached a  climax with a  German and Polish  confrontation 
over voting rights in mid-2007. In the end a compromise was achieved 
and the new Treaty was to be signed at Lisbon six months later. Rome 
was  reinvented  as  Lisbon.  However,  the  latter  had some of  the  overt 
constitutional symbols removed and included a host of inelegant opt outs, 
and special protocols. Can any comparative insights be drawn? Actually 
they  can.  As  noted  in  the  previous  section,  federal  systems  are 
characterised  by  a  frequent  need  to  adjust  their  constitutional  text  –
whether by express amendment or judicial interpretation - to deal with 
internal and external challenges. Where powers not explicitly delegated to 
the centre are reserved to the sub-units, as in Switzerland and the US, 
federalisation will involve periodic constitutional adjustment. Admittedly, 
constitutional amendments in the US have been few and far between with 
only twenty-seven thus far. Instead, it has been the Supreme Court that 
has played the crucial role in adapting existing constitutional provisions to 
internal  and  external  challenges.  Switzerland’s  detailed  and  codified 
Constitution  of  1848,  however,  was  soon  in  need  of  revision.  In  part 
propelled by a new wave of democratisation at the Cantonal level during 
the  mid-1860s  and  the  need  for  new  competencies  for  the  centre,  a 
revised constitution was proposed by the executive in 1871 and put to the 
people  the  following  year  (Lehmbruch  1993).  Intriguingly,  like  the 
European  Constitution  it  failed.  In  fact,  it  was  perceived  as  too 
centralising,  especially  by  the  French-speaking  part.  As  with  Lisbon,  a 
repackaged version was negotiated and resubmitted to the people three 
years  later.  The  difference,  of  course,  is  that  the  new  package  was 
accepted by the Swiss people in 1874. It is important to note that as a 
compensation  for  a  certain  degree  of  federalisation,  the  newly  revised 
Swiss  Federal  Constitution  of  1874  incorporated  novel  mechanisms  of 
direct democracy, such as the federal legislative referendum,10 while the 
federal level citizens’ initiative followed 18 years later in 1891.
Another major difference between the Swiss and EU example is that the 
former had overcome the unanimity constraint (Trechsel 2005). In the EU 
case, in other words, constitutional revision involves unanimity among the 
sub-units.  Thus, while there were parallels in terms of  re-submitting a 
constitutional  document  to  the  people  important  procedural  difference 
remained. Trechsel (2005) has referred to this unanimity constraint as the 
‘federalist deficit’. In principle, it need not be. In fact, unanimity might not 
have  mattered  if  ratifying  Lisbon  would  have  proceeded  through  the 
parliamentary route. The period of reflection had provided EU elites with a 
unique  opportunity  to  try  and  neutralise  the  referendum  threat  by 
agreeing  on  a  parliamentary  ratification  procedure  that  would  avert  a 
popular vote. There was one problem however. Ireland, with 0.8 per cent 
10 Citizens could oppose a federal law within 100 days of its official publication. It was followed 
in 1891 by the introduction of the citizens’ initiative at the federal level.
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of the EU population and one of the smallest EU member states, has a 
mandatory  referendum  provision  for  amendments  to  its  constitution 
ensuring that the Reform Treaty had to be submitted to a popular vote. As 
with the European Constitution, the fact that Dublin would hold a popular 
vote on the Lisbon Treaty triggered a domino effect of referendum politics 
across the EU. By referendum politics on the Lisbon Treaty we refer to 
politicisation of the issue –whether or not to hold a referendum- within 
and  across  the  member  states.  This  was  particularly  acute  in  some 
member states such as the UK and Holland. In others, politicisation took 
slightly different forms. Since a referendum is prohibited at the national 
level  in  Germany,  opposition  has  taken  the  form  of  constitutional 
challenges. It is not the first time either, the same happened with the 
1991 Maastricht Treaty. A similar dynamic occurred in the Czech Republic 
where  the  Constitutional  court  will  decide  on  the  compatibility  of  the 
Lisbon Treaty with its domestic constitutional order.11 In the end it was 
Ireland that submitted the constitutional package to a popular vote and 
Dublin that announced the 53 per cent vote against the Lisbon Treaty in 
June 2008. It is clearly too early to tell what will happen to Lisbon after 
the Irish ‘no’. A few pointers, however, can be offered. The reaction of the 
European Council  is  illustrative  in  this  regard.  Whereas  it  called  for  a 
‘period of reflection’ after the French and Dutch ‘no’, in the aftermath of 
Dublin it reached a very different conclusion. The ratification process was 
to continue as planned and the Irish, in the meantime, would decide what 
to  do  next  and  duly  inform  their  colleagues  at  the  next  scheduled 
summit.12 Many EU elites are hoping that the Irish will re-submit Lisbon to 
a popular vote as they did when the Nice Treaty was rejected in 2001. 
This appears a tall  order however.  Perhaps we have reached a critical 
juncture marking the beginning of the fall of EU-related direct democracy. 
6. Four models of EU related direct democracy 
Does  the  European  Constitution  and  its  sequel(s)  represent  a  critical 
juncture  marking  the  fall  of  direct  democracy?  Furthermore,  have  EU 
elites sufficiently learnt from the episode to be able to avoid the national 
referendum trap? While theoretically plausible there are good reasons to 
believe that this is wishful thinking. To show why, we shall need to return 
to the four models of EU-related direct democracy to which we have now 
added a label for model 4. This article’s main argument is that model 1, 
the  status quo model, is the source of institutional instability. This is a 
relatively uncontroversial statement although our particular diagnosis of 
the problem and the resulting prognoses are likely to be less so. Let us 
recall  the  features  of  model  1.  It  is  characterised  by  the  absence  of 
11 In the UK context, the High Court in June 2008 rejected a constitutional challenge arguing 
for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. 
12 See the Presidency Conclusion, Brussels, 19/20 June 2008. Council of the European Union 
11018/08
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vertically integrated mechanisms of direct democracy and the presence of 
horizontally fragmented mechanisms of direct democracy among the sub-
units on federal-level issues. From comparative perspective, this appears 
unsustainable. Why should this be the case? Our comparative federalism 
lens has suggested that compound polities are characterised by particular 
patterns of federalisation. For instance, in charting the rise of within polity 
EU  referendums  (table  3)  we  saw  that  the  frequency  of  referendums 
neatly dovetail the proliferation of the familiar federalisation packages we 
call EU treaties. The need for these periodic constitutional readjustments 
is  deeply  rooted  in  the  legal  architecture  of  compound  polities.  In 
particular,  where  detailed  constitutional  texts  exist,  such  as  those  of 
Switzerland and the EU, the need for frequent constitutional amendments 
and/or revisions to the constitution is likely to be high. Unless the current 
Lisbon  package  (or  its  sequel)  definitively  resolves  questions  of 
institutional balance, this pattern will continue to persist. And it is here 
where  the  specific  interplay  of  federal  political  institutions  and 
mechanisms  of  direct  democracy  is  activated.  In  fact,  this  was  the 
principal  justification  for  analysing  the  referendum politics  around  the 
European Constitution in more depth. What can we deduce from this? To 
briefly answer this and relate it to our models we need to refocus on the 
nature of political contestation in the EU.
In section 2 we noted two dimensions of political contestation that are 
typical  of  compound  polities,  one  territorial  (more  or  less  European 
integration) and the other functional (left/right ideology). However, when 
we  look  at  existing  forms  of  representation  in  the  EU  a  rather 
dysfunctional  picture  emerges  that  is  inextricably  connected  to  EU 
referendum  politics.  Two  channels  of  representation  exist,  European 
Parliament elections and member state elections. The EU’s constitutional 
architecture  is  presently  structured  in  such  a  way  that  the  European 
Parliament has some impact on the functional  dimension, i.e. over the 
nature  of  EU  policy  outputs.  Authority  with  regard  to  the  territorial 
dimension  (more/less  European  integration),  however,  rests  with  the 
member states. Reflecting on this problem, Peter Mair has argued that the 
EU is largely depoliticized as a result of the deliberate strategy of elites 
who are reluctant to be constrained by popular democracy (Mair 2007). 
Thus,  EU  elites  have  depoliticised  the  EU  issue  from  member  state 
elections,  where  it  presently  matters,  and  competed  on  the 
Europeanisation  issue  (more/less  integration)  during  European 
Parliamentary  electoral  contests,  where  it  is  largely  irrelevant.  The 
cumulative  impact,  according  to  Mair  (2007),  is  that  citizens  are  not 
offered channels for the legitimate expression of opposition in principle to 
the EU,  and,  because citizens  are denied a political  arena in  which to 
contest Europe, they are propelled into opposing the EU polity as a whole. 
The politicisation around EU-related referendums can be understood as a 
manifestation  of  this  dynamic,  i.e.  the  absence  of  institutionalised 
mechanisms of opposition to the EU. 
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Figure 2: The four models of EU-related direct democracy 
The importance of legitimate political opposition as a central component of 
liberal  democracy,  has  been  repeatedly  emphasised  by  one  of  the 
foremost  scholars  of  democracy,  Robert  Dahl  (see  also  Stepan  1990; 
Kirchheimer 1957).  Although there is a comparative politics literature on 
models  of  opposition,  these  usually  take  the  classic  parliamentary  or 
Westminster  models  as  the  true  model  (for  reviews  see  Helms 2004; 
Blondel 1997; von Beyme 1987). However, this model of parliamentary 
opposition  clearly  does not  apply  to  our  sample  of  compound polities. 
While the US pattern of opposition is commonly understood to take the 
form of congressional  opposition to the presidency (or vice versa), the 
Swiss case appears to be characterised by the absence of institutionalised 
opposition (Helms 2004; Rose 2000; Glass 1978). In the latter case, all 
major political  forces are represented in a federal-level  grand coalition 
that does not risk, according to Richard Rose, the purgatory of opposition 
(Rose 2000). Obviously, the type of electoral system (e.g. proportional 
versus majoritarian) matters  here.  Nonetheless,  in  terms of  models  of 
opposition,  unlike  the  US  model  the  Swiss  system  does  not  possess 
mechanisms  for  voters  to  express  their  dissatisfaction  with  governing 
parties and ‘kick the rascals out’ of office (on the US/EU see Føllesdal & 
Hix  2006).  Clearly,  mechanisms  of  opposition  do  exist  in  Switzerland 
though these take a special form. This has been categorised as the ‘direct 
democratic model of political opposition’ (Helms 2004). In other words, 
mechanisms  of  direct  democracy  are  the  institutional  channel  through 
which  the  function  of  opposition  is  performed.  Furthermore,  these 
channels  have  been  at  the  centre  of  political  competition  over  the 
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‘territorial’  cleavage.  Perhaps there are lessons to  be drawn here with 
regard to the EU. Some were identified in the analysis of the referendum 
politics of the European Constitution and its sequel(s) in section 5. In the 
absence of other channels to mobilise against the EU, political opposition 
to the EU has seized, where available, the tool of sub-unit referendums on 
federal  level issues to express anti-federalisation preferences. Are such 
preferences likely to disappear? If comparative politics has any insights to 
offer the answer is definitely ‘no’. What, then, are the options for the EU? 
If  model  1 is  unsustainable  what are the possibilities  for  an EU move 
towards model 2 for which the US can be considered as a prototype. This 
move  appears  the  most  straightforward  in  many  respects.  It  merely 
implies two things: first no EU level referendum and, second, no member 
state referendums on EU issues. The first element is easy to address since 
it does not exist. The second presents a number of problems however. 
Essentially, it involves banning sub-unit referendums on EU-level issues. 
There are two ways of trying to achieve this, one informal the other more 
formal. The informal route was tried during the Lisbon process. After the 
rejection of the European Constitution, EU elites performed a colossal act 
of collusion that involved neutralising the referendum threat by ensuring 
that  member states  pursued a parliamentary  ratification  rather  than a 
popular vote. This heroic coordination effort is not to be underestimated, 
but, as the argument above suggests, it is unlikely that this could ever be 
repeated,  especially  if  the  ‘sleeping  giant’  of  European  political 
contestation has finally awoken. Besides, it did not work. Ireland voted 
no.
The second option, the formal route, would involve prohibiting member 
states from undertaking referendums on EU issues. Some clarification of 
what  is  meant  by  EU  issues  is  in  order.  Here,  we  are  referring  to 
referendums on the familiar EU treaties, what Andreas Auer (2007) has 
labelled  ‘integration  referendums’  as  opposed  to  what  he  calls  an 
‘accession referendum’. The latter includes referendums on adopting, say 
the Euro currency. Thus, a referendum by a sub-unit on acceding, say to 
the Eurozone, is legitimate since the consequences are only felt within 
that sub-unit rather than the polity as a whole.13 We can already begin to 
see the legal minefield that this could open up. Furthermore, historically, 
EU treaties have bundled ‘accession’ and ‘integration’ issues into a single 
constitutional package (e.g. the Maastricht Treaty). Still, in principle it is 
possible that the two could be distinguished resulting in the constitutional 
prohibition  of  sub-unit  referendums  on  so-called  EU  ‘integration 
referendums’.  How could  this  be  achieved?  For  a  start  at  least  three 
member states, Ireland, Denmark and France would have to change their 
constitutions.  Even if  this  were feasible,  which we believe  it  is  not,  it 
would still  leave unanswered the root problem: an absence of effective 
13 The same applies to a referendum on enlargement by one of the sub-units, e.g. a vote by 
France on Turkey joining the EU. 
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participatory  or  input-oriented  democratic  instruments  on  EU  issues. 
Member state executives would continue to do business as usual at the 
grand summits and decide on the future pace of integration. As we have 
argued above, while summits dealt with technical regulatory issues this 
was  fine,  but  as  soon as  the  focus  shifts  to,  say  justice  and internal 
security issues, or foreign and defence affairs, politicisation occurs. If our 
political elites cannot be trusted, then, how about putting our trust in non-
majoritarian  institutions?  This  question  opens  a  curious  option,  the 
German model. It is functionally equivalent to the US model, i.e. federal 
level referendums do not exist and neither can the sub-units undertake 
popular votes on federal issues. How, then, do they resolve the inevitable 
tensions that may arise? The Lisbon Treaty (and the earlier Maastricht 
Treaty) gave us a glimpse of the model. In the absence of mechanisms of 
popular consultation, political opposition has taken to the Courts. Thus, 
the decision is left to a non-majoritarian institution, the German Federal 
Constitutional  Court (Majone 2005). It is highly unlikely, however, that 
the European Court of Justice would ever be given such a power.
If  a  move  towards  model  2  looks  fraught  with  difficulties,  how about 
model 3 for which Switzerland can be considered as a proto-type? A move 
in  this  direction  has,  in  fact,  already  been  taken.  Article  I-47  of  the 
European  Constitution  included  provisions  for  an  EU-wide  citizens’ 
initiative requiring the collection of 1 million signatures across EU member 
states  for  requesting  that  the  Commission  propose  EU  legislation. 
Furthermore, despite the rejection of the European Constitution, the same 
provision  was  kept  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty  under  Article  8b.  Does  this 
suggest any parallels with the introduction of the citizens’ initiative at the 
federal level in Switzerland? We know from the Swiss case, for instance, 
that  the  introduction  of  such  an  innovation  had  unanticipated 
consequences by providing new channels for mobilising political opposition 
(Lehmbruch 1993). We also know from our discussion that the EU suffers 
from  the  absence  of  participatory  channels  for  mobilising  political 
opposition in the EU. Nonetheless, the comparison should not be pushed 
too  far.  Without  downplaying  the  significance  of  the  instrument  (for 
instance the US has not implemented one despite numerous calls), the EU 
variant of bottom-up direct democracy is really a petition rather than a 
full-blown citizens’ initiative a la Suisse. Still, as this discussion suggests, 
if  implemented it  could have unintended political  effects.  However,  the 
focus of  this  article  has  not  been on bottom-up mechanisms of  direct 
democracy such as citizens’  initiatives.  Instead, the defining feature of 
model 3 is a federal level referendum. Here, the potential for an EU-wide 
referendum  would  constitute  a  revolutionary  act  of  considerable 
proportions.  For  a  start,  it  would  only  make  sense  if  the  unanimity 
principle  were  overcome.  In  other  words,  some  super-majoritarian 
threshold would have to be instituted for it to have any functional utility. 
It  seems  that,  much  like  banning  member  state  referendums  on  EU 
integration, and perhaps even more so, a revolutionary act of this nature 
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seems quite implausible at this particular juncture. The full repertoire of 
Swiss direct democracy instruments is clearly not feasible for the EU, as 
the EU version of the citizens’ initiative demonstrates, though some less 
institutionalised variants could perhaps emerge over time. 
If variants of US model 2, or Swiss model 3, are presently implausible 
what of model 4, the variable geometry model. There has been much talk 
of variable geometry or a Europe of two speeds. Could such a model be 
applied  to  EU-related  referendums?  In  essence,  variable  geometry 
involves an inner core of  the sub-units pushing ahead with integration 
while  an  outer  core  waits  until  it  can  overcome  domestic  political 
constraints  should  it  wish  to  join.  Indeed,  there  are  constitutional 
mechanisms, known as ‘enhanced cooperation’, that allow a select group 
of member states (at least eight) to push ahead in a given policy domain 
using  the  EU  machinery  (Bribosia  2007).   The  problem  is  that  these 
provisions  relate  to  particular  policy  fields  rather  than  a  polity’s  basic 
constitutional  architecture.  If  the  Lisbon Treaty  starts  to  unravel,  then 
variable  geometry  may  become  a  reality  even  for  the  EU’s  basic 
constitutional  architecture.  Let  us  examine  this  theoretical  construct 
further  with  regard  to  EU-related  referendums.  The  upper  right  box 
suggests the presence of vertically  integrated referendum mechanisms, 
i.e. an EU-level referendum, but with horizontally fragmented mechanisms 
at the sub-unit level, i.e. variation among the member states with regard 
to referendums on EU integration issues (as is presently the case). This 
sounds  bizarre.  How  would  it  work?  Essentially,  some  variant  of 
“enhanced cooperation” could be used to institute a vertically integrated 
referendum for an inner core of member states. These sub-units could 
submit further federalisation packages to a popular vote across the inner-
core in the same way referendums are held in Switzerland or Australia. 
However, the outer-core would not be subject to this procedure, hence 
the horizontal fragmentation. In a way there are already precedents for 
this, such as the eurozone for monetary matters and Schengen for certain 
justice and home affairs issues. The crucial point is that decision-making 
in these areas is presently not subject to a popular vote, neither is it likely 
to  be.  The variable geometry model represents a legal  nightmare,  but 
then the EU as a polity is no stranger to this. Still,  the model appears 
rather implausible and is pursued here for mainly theoretical  purposes. 
The logic of this variable geometry could also be inverted. This is probably 
more  plausible  and  legally  more  elegant.  In  this  case,  the  sub-units 
forming the inner-core would formally agree  not to hold EU integration 
referendums.  Functionally  speaking,  this  would  take  us  from model  4 
towards model 2. 
So,  where  have  we  ended  up?  At  first  sight  it  may  appear  that  the 
comparative route has led us to an unsatisfactory end destination. Though 
we have steadfastly followed the comparative track to analyse EU related 
models  of  direct  democracy,  we are unable  to  adjudicate between the 
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competing models, especially 2 and 3. This is not unrelated to the fact 
that the process we have analysed is at an embryonic stage. Nonetheless, 
the  comparative  method  has  allowed  us  to  isolate  some  institutional 
features that are linked to particular outcomes and this has revealed some 
novel insights about the EU. In doing so, the comparative perspective has 
also demonstrated why model 1 is unsustainable while pointing to possible 
institutional trajectories. In short we learn by comparing. But, the nature 
of comparison matters. Much of the literature on EU-related referendums, 
though technically comparative, suffers from the classic problem of not 
being able to see the forest for the trees. It compares the trees rather 
than the forest. Behaviourist approaches, in particular, can get so caught 
up in small details that they fail to grasp the bigger picture. Without more 
explicit  cross-polity  comparison,  the  approach is  probably  ill-suited  for 
analysing future institutional trajectories of the EU. The simple argument 
put  forward  in  this  article  is  that  adopting  a  broader  comparative 
perspective provides us with a lens with which to view the bigger picture. 
In  terms  of  the  bigger  picture,  while  we  cannot  choose  between  the 
models we can ascertain that in terms of a host of institutional features 
(apart from size and population) the EU comes closest to the Swiss model 
of  federalism.  Whether  we  focus  on  the  structure  of  the  collegial 
executive,  electoral  systems,  consensus  styles  of  policy-making, 
decentralised modes of  policy implementation,  territorially  concentrated 
cross-cutting  cleavages,  modes  of  interest  intermediation,  party 
fragmentation indices, and much else, the similarities are quite striking. 
None  of  this  implies  the  EU  will  follow  the  Swiss  trajectory  of  direct 
democracy, which in its full manifestation is clearly infeasible for the EU. 
At  best,  and given the embryonic stage of  development, we can learn 
from comparing the interplay of EU federalism and direct democracy with 
other polities such as the US and Switzerland. 
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